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Grahame Boocock and Margaret Woods are Lecturers in Banking and Finance, and 
Financial Management, respectively at Loughborough University Business School, 
England.  The paper examines how venture fund managers select their investee 
companies, by exploring the evaluation criteria and the decision making process 
adopted at one UK Regional Venture Fund (henceforth referred to as the Fund).  The 
analysis confirms that relatively consistent evaluation criteria are applied across the 
industry and corroborates previous models which suggest that venture capitalists’ 
decision making consists of several stages.  With the benefit of access to the Fund’s 
internal records, however, this paper adds to the current literature by differentiating 
the evaluation criteria used at each successive stage of the decision-making 
process.  The paper presents a model of the Fund’s activities which demonstrates 
that the relative importance attached to the evaluation criteria changes as 
applications are systematically processed.  Proposals have to satisfy different criteria 
at each stage of the decision-making process before they receive funding.  In the 
vast majority of cases, applications are rejected by the fund managers.  In addition, 
the length of time taken by the fund managers in appraising propositions can lead to 
the withdrawal of applications at an advanced stage. 
 
Lorenz (1989, p5) defines venture capital as long-term, equity-based risk finance 
where the primary reward for the investor is capital gain.  Such funding seeks out 
and nurtures high growth entrepreneurial companies which are frequently refused 
finance from conventional sources (Ray, 1993).  On the same theme, Bygrave and 
Timmons (1992, p1) describe venture capital as playing “... a catalytic role in the 
entrepreneurial process, (offering) fundamental value creation that triggers and 
sustains economic growth and revival”.  However, they also draw a distinction 
between “classic venture capital”, early-stage financing, and “merchant capital”, a 
hybrid that combines classic venture capital with development financing and 
investments in leveraged and management buy-outs.    
  
UK venture capital investment activity has mirrored the operations of venture fund 
managers across the world by moving in favour of merchant capital at the expense 
of smaller value investments in higher risk start-ups (BVCA, various).  This trend 
tends to confirm the widely expressed view that there is a shortage of long-term 
funding at the lower end of the financing spectrum (Bannock et al., 1991, p31), 
although it has proved difficult to isolate an “equity gap” in practice (University of 
Cambridge, 1992).  In an attempt to plug this perceived gap in the market, Midland 
Bank proposed, in the early 1990s, to introduce a number of venture funds 
concentrating on small investments (McMeekin, 1991).  A network of 11 regional 
enterprise funds was eventually launched in 1992.  This paper focuses on the 
activities of one of the funds, the Midland Enterprise Fund for the East Midlands.  
  
The high costs encountered in providing classic venture capital provided the 
rationale for the formation of these funds.  The costs stem from the requirement to 
undertake “due diligence”1 including credit searches and detailed analysis of the 
financial viability of the proposition; the charges levied for undertaking this appraisal 
are often prohibitive in relation to the amount of funding sought.  Midland Bank 
proposed to overcome this cost barrier by persuading accountants, solicitors and 
other professionals to offer their services at reduced fees.  The professional firms 
would hopefully be compensated for the short-term loss of income by a flow of new 
clients.  This cost cutting was “at the heart of the proposal to bridge the (equity) gap 
in a commercially viable way” (McMeekin, 1991).  
  
Another important function of the proposed Midland network was to advise firms on 
alternative sources of external finance, including the role of informal risk capital 
provided by private individuals.  There is growing evidence that “business angels” 
have the potential to complement the institutional venture capital market (for 
example:  ACOST, 1990; Mason and Harrison, 1993 and 1994).  
  
Previous research on the venture capital sector has covered such diverse areas as 
the size and composition of venture fund portfolios, the fate of firms rejected by 
venture funds and the analysis of how venture capitalists allocate their workload 
(Fried and Hisrich, 1988).  The focus of greatest attention, however, has been the 
venture capitalist’s decision-making process2.    
  
Research in this area can be classified under two headings:  
 
• analysis of the investment cycle3 as a whole (for example:  Tybejee and 
Bruno, 1984;  Silver, 1985;  Hall, 1989;  Hall and Hofer, 1993;  and, Fried and 
Hisrich, 1994);  
 
• identification of the evaluation/selection criteria4 utilised in deciding which 
applications to reject or accept (for example:  Tybejee and Bruno 1984;  
MacMillan et al., 1985 and 1987;  Dixon, 1991;  Hall and Hofer, 1993;  and, 
Rah et al., 1994).  
 
Using detailed data from a single fund, the contribution of this paper is to explore the 
linkages between the two main strands of the literature identified above.  The 
principal aims of the paper, therefore, are:  
 
• to identify the investment cycle and selection criteria used by the Fund in 
deciding which applications to reject or support ; 
 
• to demonstrate that the selection criteria change as an application progresses 
through the various stages in the decision-making process. 
 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: 
 
(i) the main features of the Fund are described and the research methodology is 
outlined    
 
(ii) the Fund’s investment cycle and evaluation criteria are identified and 
compared with those in the existing literature  
 
(iii) a model of the decision-making process is developed for the Fund, linking the 
selection criteria to the various stages of the decision-making process  
 
(iv) finally, the implications of our findings for both academics and practitioners 
are discussed.  
 
 
The Midland Enterprise Fund for the East Midlands  
 
The Fund has a sum of £1.25m to invest, primarily in projects smaller than those 
backed by other venture funds.  The size of deal can range from a minimum of 
£5,000 to a maximum of £125,000, although larger syndicated deals are possible.  
Investee companies have to be located within the East Midlands (the five counties of 
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire and Derbyshire) 
and to demonstrate the capacity for rapid growth.  The region offers a strongly 
diversified industrial base, with a growing services sector; its economic performance 
has remained above average, despite the setback of coalfield closures.  The Fund is 
prepared to invest in companies situated in any industry and at any stage of 
development, but a maximum of 15 percent of the investment pool is to be devoted 
to start-ups.  
 
In common with the majority of independent funds, the Fund is structured as a 
limited partnership.  It has a life of ten years, and the intention is to make 
investments over the first five years of its life, 1992-1997.  The investors include 
Midland Bank, local Training and Enterprise Councils and a number of individuals; all 
investors are motivated by the prospects of commercial gains, and the TECs are 
also keen to promote SMEs in their catchment areas.  The investors have no 
influence on general investment policy or specific investment decisions.  All 
investment decisions are the responsibility of the fund management company - 
Midlands Venture Fund Managers Limited (MVFML).  The Managing Director of 
MVFML (over the period of this study) was an experienced fund manager with wide 
knowledge of the venture capital industry; the other directors are prominent local 
businessmen.  A small support team, seconded from Midland Bank, assisted with the 
assessment of applications.    
  
The Fund is hoping to achieve a rate of return in line with the average for the venture 
capital industry.  The fund managers receive a modest annual fee for operating the 
Fund, a fee from each investee company on completion of an investment and, in 
accordance with standard industry practice, there is a “carried interest, profit sharing 
clause” enabling the fund managers to share in the success of investee companies.  
  
Applications to the Fund were a mix of unsolicited applications and referrals from 
intermediaries, with the balance over time moving towards the latter.  In the first two 
years of the Fund’s life, October 1992 to October 1994, activity was as follows:  
 
 
Total applications   232 
Applications assessed  206 
Investments        3 
Rejections    203 
Investment ratio               1.46% 
Awaiting decision     26 
 
The Research Methodology  
 
Our approach was to analyse all 232 applications received by the Fund over the first 
two years of its existence.  (For a fuller description of the initial enquiries and 
applications received by the Fund, see Boocock, Woods and Caley, 1995.)  With the 
full co-operation of MVFML, data were collected in a variety of ways:  from semi-
structured interviews with officials; by classifying the contents of comprehensive 
working notes and reports on applications; and by analysing statistics on applications 
rejected and accepted.  The data sought was broad-ranging, although the focus was 
on the evaluation criteria used to judge applications.  The frequency of citation of 
specific criteria enabled the researchers to establish key factors in the decision-
making process.  
 
This method of data collection removes potential methodological weaknesses 
acknowledged by MacMillan et al. (1985, p122).  The data set is not open to errors 
and biases arising from self reporting, nor does it rely upon the venture capitalists' 
ability to recall the factors influencing their decisions.  Applications were tracked as 
they moved through the investment cycle.  The material is drawn directly from the 
Fund’s records and, at the time the comments were entered, the managers were not 
aware that their observations would be used for research purposes.  As a result, our 
data set captures the genuine reactions of the fund managers as meetings were 
taking place or critical decisions to accept/reject applications were being made.  
 
We believe that this study is unique for the UK.  Researchers in the United States 
have sometimes been able to gain access to venture capitalists’ private documents, 
but this is the exception rather than the rule (Norton, 1993).  Our findings would be of 
little value, nonetheless, if the Fund operated in a “non-standard” way.  This does not 
appear to be the case.  Notwithstanding its relatively modest size and focus on 
smaller deals, the Fund’s investment philosophy is entirely governed by commercial 
considerations.    
  
The Fund’s investment ratio of 1.46 percent over the first two years of operations 
appears to be lower than the industry averages suggested by Sweeting (1991, 
p612), 2 percent, and Bannock (1991, p47), 3.4 percent.  A below average figure 
might have been anticipated, because larger deals are excluded and a high 
proportion of the initial enquiries and applications to the Fund were of very poor 
quality.  Furthermore, the fund managers were understandably keen to create a 
“demonstration effect” by backing successful firms, hence it was very important that 
the first few investments did not fail (Boocock, Woods and Caley, 1995).  
Nevertheless, another of the proposals being evaluated at October 1994 resulted in 
an investment, bringing the Fund’s investment ratio up to almost 2 percent.  This 
investment record also compares favourably with other Midland Enterprise Funds.  
Information obtained on a confidential basis from two funds revealed that, over the 
equivalent period, they had completed 3 investments from 194 applications (1.54 
percent) and 2 investments from 138 applications (1.44 percent) respectively.  
 
The Investment Cycle  
 
This approach to analysing venture capitalists’ operations focuses on the sequential 
nature of the investment cycle.  
  
In 1984, Tybejee and Bruno described the cycle as an orderly process of five 
sequential steps:  deal origination; screening; evaluation; deal structuring;  and post-
investment activities.  Silver (1985) refined the above framework by replacing 
evaluation with due diligence and introducing the concept of cashing out.  Hall (1989) 
increased the number of stages, by the addition of assessment after screening.  
More recently, Fried and Hisrich (1994) modelled the decision-making process 
(excluding post-investment activities) in six stages: deal origination; venture capital 
firm-specific screen; generic screen; first-phase evaluation; second-phase 
evaluation; and, closing.  
  
The precise number of stages (and the terminology) differs between studies, but 
there is general agreement that the decision-making process involves at least two 
stages - screening and evaluation/due diligence - and that the investment cycle 
consists of multiple stages.  A comparison between selected previous studies and 
the approach taken by this Midland Enterprise Fund is contained in Table 1.   
The investment cycle adopted by the Fund is now described in detail.  
  
1.  Generating a Deal Flow:  prospective investments emanate from a variety of 
sources, including unsolicited applications, via intermediaries and referrals from 
other financial institutions.  
  
2.  Initial Screening:  the fund management company (MVFML) employs a small 
number of staff to deal with a relatively large number of applications, hence the 
screening stage is rapid and the rejection rate high.  (This confirmed the findings in a 
previous UK study, which suggested that the average first reading time for an 
application is 10-15 minutes: Sweeting, 1991, p610.)  In essence, screening consists 
of a perusal of the business plan in a search for key features which indicate that 
closer study might be worthwhile.  
 
3.  First Meeting:  the M/D meets with representatives of the firm, usually at the 
applicant's business site, to form judgements on, for example, production capacity, 
marketing plans and the ability of the management team.  
  
4.  Second Meeting:  further information on the business and its management is 
obtained.  Another director of MVFML leads this meeting, allowing MVFML the 
opportunity to vet the potential investee company from a different perspective.  The 
second meeting helps to secure the Fund’s “emotional commitment” to the proposal 
(Fried and Hisrich, 1994, p34).  It is also vital to ensure that the owners of the firm 
understand the nature of venture capital.    
  
5.  Presentation to Board of Directors:  the potential investee company has to make 
a brief presentation to the full Board, despite the fact that the proposition has been 
examined by two directors.  This step is unusual, allowing all of the Board of 
directors of the Fund Management Company the opportunity to decide whether a 
proposal meets the Fund’s criteria.  
6.  Due Diligence:  there is now agreement in principle to provide the finance, hence 
this stage comprises credit searches on the company (and its owners) and detailed 
analysis of the financial viability of the proposition; the financial projections form the 
basis for structuring the deal and eventual realisation of the investment.  An 
unconditional offer of funding is not issued until the due diligence stage is completed. 
 
7.  Deal Structuring:  the fund managers are prepared to mix equity, convertible 
instruments and pure loan finance as appropriate.  The use of ratchets enables 
entrepreneurs to reduce the Fund’s equity stake in their business if performance 
targets are met.  Negotiations at this stage are critical.  Entrepreneurs are very 
sensitive to what they perceive as the imposition of unfair terms in the funding offer.  
  
8.  Ongoing Monitoring of Investments:  one of the characteristics of venture finance 
is an active interest in the performance of investee companies, described as a 
combination of capital and consulting by Warne (1988).  This Fund is no exception.  
The emphasis is on the free flow of information and ideas, rather than hands-on 
management.  The Fund can take an active management role, however, when either 
or both parties judge that this course of action is necessary.    
 
9.  Cashing Out:  it is anticipated that the investments will be realised by trade sale to 
a larger company, company buy-back or, in very exceptional circumstances, by 
flotation.  
 
At each stage of the decision-making process (Stages 2-7 for the Fund studied 
here), the evaluation criteria used by fund managers play a crucial role.  An 
examination of these criteria, the subject of extensive research in the past, forms the 
basis of the next section of this paper.  
  
 
 
Table 1: Stages of Venture Capitalists’ Investment Cycle 
  
  Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984)  
Hall (1989)  Fried and Hisrich (1994)  Present Study  
1.  Deal origination  Generating a deal flow  Deal origination  Generating a deal flow  
2.  Screening  Proposal screening  Firm-specific screen  Initial screening  
3.  n/a  Proposal assessment  Generic screen  First meeting  
4.  Evaluation  Project evaluation  First phase evaluation  Second meeting  
5.  n/a  n/a  n/a  Board presentation  
6.  n/a  Due diligence  Second phase evaluation  Due diligence  
7.  Deal structuring  Deal structuring  Closing  Deal structuring  
8.  Post investment 
activities  
Venture operations  n/a  On-going monitoring of investments  
9.  n/a  Cashing out  n/a  Cashing out  
 
Lines are used to separate different stages in the cycle 
 
Source:  Adapted from Hall and Hofer (1993), Table II, p. 28.  
Evaluation Criteria  
 
Venture capitalists are conspicuously successful at selecting new growth ventures 
(Bruno and Tybejee, 1983; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992), an outcome which 
suggests that appropriate selection criteria are utilised.  A "modest degree of 
convergence" (MacMillan et al., 1987, p134) is evident in the evaluation criteria 
identified in key previous studies and the current research.  These criteria are 
collated in Table 2. [N.B. Table 2 employs the format introduced by Hall and Hofer 
(1993), with amendments to reflect the fact that key factors cited by the original 
authors appear to have been omitted by Hall and Hofer.]  
  
Tybejee and Bruno (1984) viewed the investment decision as a balancing act 
between negative (“risk”) and positive (“return”) factors.  Negative factors such as 
weak management resulted in the rejection of proposals, while positive factors 
including attractive market conditions were essential for acceptance.   
  
MacMillan et al. (1985) cited the most important evaluation criteria as the 
entrepreneur's personality and experience rather than product or market factors.  
The core issue for attracting finance was whether the plan demonstrated that the 
"jockey was fit to ride".  Unfortunately, the way in which venture capitalists could 
accurately measure the required managerial capabilities was not specified.  Using 
the same normative approach, Dixon (1991) confirmed the importance of 
entrepreneurial skills for UK venture funds.  
  
The studies above examined evaluation criteria from an ex ante perspective, an 
approach which was also taken in the present study.  However, the core factors for 
the Fund (set out in the final column of Table 2) extended beyond the characteristics 
and skills of the entrepreneur to encompass a whole range of issues, including fund-
specific requirements and market factors.  This outcome appears to reflect 
commercial reality.  The success of any business depends upon the interaction of a 
number of factors; for example, an attractive product is necessary, but good 
management is also vital.  The findings of ex post studies on evaluation criteria 
confirm the importance of non-managerial factors.   
TABLE 2: Findings on Venture Capitalists’ Investment Criteria   
  USA  UK 
Investment Criteria  Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984)  
MacMillan 
et al. (1985)  
MacMillan  
et al. (1987)  
Dixon  
(1991)  
This  
study  
Venture capital firm requirements            
Cash out potential  X  X      X  
Familiarity with technology, product,  market   X           
Financial provision for investors  X          
Geographic location  X        X  
Size of investment  X        X  
Stage of development  X        X  
Characteristics of the proposal            
Requirement for additional material          X  
Characteristics of the entrepreneur/team            
Ability to evaluate risk    X        
Articulate re: venture    X  X      
Background/experience    X  X  X  X  
Capable of sustained effort    X  X      
Managerial capabilities  X  X  X    X  
Marketing skills        X    
Financial skills        X    
Stake in firm        X    
Nature of the proposed business            
Product/market considerations  X          
Economic Environment of proposed business            
Market attractiveness  X  X  X  X  X  
Potential size        X  X  
Threat resistance  X          
Strategy of the proposed business            
Product differentiation  X        X  
Proprietary product    X  X      
 
  
Source: Adapted from Hall and Hofer (1993 p27)  
In examining the performance of investee companies, MacMillan et al. (1987) found 
the most important factors for success to be demonstrated market acceptance of the 
product and insulation against competitive attack.  These “market” factors should 
perhaps have featured more strongly in the evaluation criteria identified in ex ante 
studies, especially as such factors appear to be easier to assess on an objective 
basis than the entrepreneur’s personality or experience.    
  
Rah et al. (1994) tried to overcome potential methodological flaws in the MacMillan 
studies by studying the same propositions from an ex ante and ex post standpoint.  
Three separate investment models were developed, two ex ante and one ex post.  
Market attractiveness was found to be the prime concern in the two pre-investment 
models, whereas the most influential factor on venture performance was managerial 
capability.  
  
Overall, managerial and market factors have been consistently recognised in the 
literature on the investment cycle, but there have been variations in the weightings 
given to individual criteria.  One explanation for these differences is that the venture 
capitalists’ decision-making process may not have been fully captured because of 
methodological shortcomings in previous studies.    
  
Doubts on the legitimacy of research data were cited above (MacMillan et al., 1985).  
Comparisons between evaluation criteria used at different stages of the decision-
making process may have generated some spurious results.  In studies which have 
emphasised market issues (Rah et al., 1994) or entrepreneurial characteristics 
(MacMillan et al., 1985; and Dixon, 1991), the respondents may not have specified 
the stage at which particular criteria are relevant.  On a different theme, Sandberg et 
al. (1988, p9) stated that prior research has “failed to capture and convey the 
richness, subtlety and discernment embodied in the venture capitalist’s decision 
process and criteria”.  These separate concerns were combined in the suggestion 
that future research has to move from a “single-stage, single set of criteria to the 
more complex and realistic perspective of a multi-stage, multi-criteria and multi-
person decision" (Hall and Hofer, 1993, p40).  
 
 
Given the potential limitations of research in this field, it is important to describe in 
detail how the evaluation criteria used by the Midland Enterprise Fund were 
identified.  Information was collected from the fund managers’ working notes and/or 
final reports on the plans submitted.  The final reports were summaries of the fund 
managers’ views in relation to the applications.  Even though the vast majority of 
applications were rejected, it was relatively straightforward to extract the positive 
factors sought by the fund managers - a rejection on the grounds of "No Unique 
Selling Point (USP)” clearly implies that the presence of an USP is a desirable 
feature.  The key factors sought by the fund managers are included in the final 
column of Table 2.    
  
Applications were rejected for failing to meet one or more of the fund managers’ 
evaluation criteria; all the factors cited for the rejection of every application were 
collated from the working notes/final reports.  These factors were then aggregated.  
To be classed as a “key factor” for the Fund (i.e., to merit an “X” in Table 2), a 
criterion had to account for more than 10 percent of the aggregate number of factors 
cited by the fund managers.  This frequency of citation ensures the exclusion of 
isolated comments applying to individual applications.  
  
Critically, the current study analyses the evaluation criteria through all stages of the 
decision-making process, recording the real time “gut feelings” and subjective views 
of the fund managers.  (This approach goes some way towards countering the 
methodological issues raised above by MacMillan et al. and Sandberg et al.)  Our 
study has therefore generated a list of key criteria which links with, but is more 
extensive than, that suggested in the literature.    
  
The range of criteria utilised by the Fund reflects the fact, as stated above, that the 
success of any business depends upon the interaction of a number of factors.  While 
it is acknowledged below that a rejection might stem from an accumulation of 
negative observations, detailed analysis of the applications submitted to the Fund 
reveals that the decision to accept or reject a proposition tends to hinge on a single 
issue.  The identification of these dominant factors forms the next section.  
 
 
Analysis of Rejections by The Fund  
  
The figures in Table 3 below are based on the prime reason for the rejection of each 
application (whereas Table 2 aggregates the factors cited for the rejection of all 
applications).  The first-named reason for rejection was extracted from the final 
report lodged with each application, on the grounds that the most critical observation 
would be placed at the top of the list5.  
 
 
TABLE 3: Reasons for Rejection of Proposals Received During the First Two 
Years of the Fund 
  
Reason For Rejection  Number Rejected Percentage 
   
Incomplete Plan  63 31 
Market Characteristics  26 13 
Lack of Unique Selling Point  8 4 
Start Up Finance  15 7 
project Size inappropriate  16 8 
Management Skills/Experience  13 6 
Excessive Risks  13 6 
Financial Factors  5 3 
Application Withdrawn  22 11 
Other  22 11 
Total  203 100 
   
Total Applications  232  
Decision-making process completed 206  
Investments Made  3  
Investment Ratio  1.46%  
   
Applications Ongoing  26  
 
 
 
The reasons for rejection include those associated with the application of the Fund’s 
evaluation criteria, as well as those stemming from the timescale involved in the 
decision-making process.    
 
On the basis of frequency of citation, with no judgement on the weight attached to 
these factors, four broad categories accounted for the majority of rejections:  
  
a) Incomplete plan 
 
An incomplete plan is defined as one where key data were omitted from the original 
submission and the proposal was deemed unworthy of further investigation.  
Incomplete plans invariably failed, to a greater or lesser degree, to comply with the 
Guidance Notes (refer to the Appendix) sent to all enquirers.  The quality of the 
application was seen by fund managers as a definite indicator of managerial 
competence and attention to detail.  One application comprised a twelve month 
cashflow projection and nothing else, another consisted of a handwritten business 
plan on a single sheet of A5 paper. 
 
If the plan was substantially "incomplete", the application was usually rejected 
quickly, with no requests for further information being made.  There were a minority 
of cases where insufficient information was provided in the business plan, but 
omissions of key data were tempered by the level of perceived market potential 
stemming from a unique product.  In such situations, the Fund adopted a proactive 
approach by calling for more evidence.  In cases where no unique selling point 
(USP) was obvious, the absence of any market research or information on growth 
prospects would inevitably lead to rejection. 
 
It was observed by the M/D that plans submitted by intermediaries were rarely 
rejected on the grounds of incompleteness.  However, such applications were not 
always of high quality.  Some intermediaries (including solicitors) seemed to fail to 
understand the role of venture capitalists, whilst others, notably accountants, placed 
excessive emphasis on financial projections.  The Guidance Notes (Appendix) state 
that expert advice is useful, but stress:  “Your plan should reflect you and your 
business ... it should be prepared by you and not by an advisor”.  The evidence from 
this Fund appears to confirm the widely held view that passing sole responsibility for 
the formulation of a business plan to an intermediary is not advisable. 
 
b) Market characteristics 
 
Once again, the scope of this category was quite wide, illustrated by a selection of 
quotes from the fund managers’ working notes: 
 
• “market too narrow and specialised to have significant growth prospects” 
• “mature and contracting market” 
•  “market saturated” 
• “insufficient growth potential” 
 
The lack of an USP was designated as a separate category for rejection, although it 
is clearly a market-related issue.  The two categories of market characteristics and 
USP in Table 3 were very important factors, accounting for 34 out of 203 rejections 
(almost 17 percent). 
  
c) Restrictions imposed by the Fund  
 
The aim of the fund managers was to realise a number of investments reasonably 
quickly, in order to recycle a proportion of the original capital invested in the Fund.  
For this reason, investments in start-up businesses were limited to 15 percent of the 
investment pool.  A number of potentially attractive start-up deals were therefore 
turned aside.  Other applications were simply too big for the Fund, even when the 
possibility of syndication was taken into account.  These two reasons accounted for 
31 out of 203 rejections (over 15 percent).    
 
d) Application withdrawn  
  
In some cases, the applicants were not prepared to comply with the due-diligence 
procedure.  The cost of due diligence was not a deterrent to applicants, because the 
philosophy of the Midland Enterprise Funds is to offer subsidised professional 
services (McMeekin, 1991).  For the Fund in the East Midlands, a support network of 
professional firms was in place, but the M/D and Board of MVFML usually possessed 
the requisite expertise to conduct the due diligence “in-house”.  A more frequent 
reason for withdrawal was changing circumstances which meant that the funds were 
no longer required, for example buy-out bids that failed.  In addition, a number of 
attractive propositions were denied to the Fund because the applicants were able to 
raise funds elsewhere on more favourable terms; 6 withdrawals (of 22 withdrawals in 
all) arose because the firms had access to alternative, preferred funding.  (If “good” 
projects tend to be funded by a reasonably competitive market for venture capital, 
this raises the interesting question of whether the equity gap for small scale 
investments might only apply to “weak” propositions.)  
 
e) Other Reasons for Rejection  
 
Apart from the four dominant categories described above, rejections also stemmed 
from a variety of reasons - grouped under the “other” heading in Table 3 - generally 
where management problems were revealed, or where the applicant was unable to 
persuade others to invest alongside the Fund.  Sample comments from the Fund’s 
internal records included:  
  
• “complementary finance in the overall funding package was not forthcoming”  
• “managers turned up late for meetings after obviously going to the pub 
beforehand”  
•  “no response to requests for further information” (a comment which applied to a 
number of proposals)  
 
As already stated, findings based on the above categorisation have to be interpreted 
with a degree of caution because applications were often rejected for a combination 
of reasons or on the overall impression created by the business plan.  For example, 
rejections on the grounds of “excessive risks” in Table 3 usually reflected the fact 
that doubt had arisen in a number of other areas.  This interaction between criteria 
also helps to explain why some factors appeared to be less important than might 
have been anticipated. 
  
A key concern for the Fund, growth potential, seldom featured in the fund managers’ 
working notes; this consideration is typically captured in the categories of “market 
characteristics” or “incomplete plan”.  Likewise, rejections rarely resulted directly 
from “financial factors”, including the analysis of financial statements and projections; 
this finding has been prevalent in previous studies (Dixon, 1991).  However, the fund 
managers did use financial projections to ascertain market attractiveness and cash-
out potential.  
  
 
TABLE 4: Reasons for Rejection of Proposals received during the first two 
years of the Fund 
 At initial 
screening
After 1st 
meeting
CUM 
TOTAL
After 2nd 
meeting  
FINAL 
TOTAL
    
Incomplete Plan  59 2 61 2  63
Market Characteristics  25 1 26 -  26
Lack Of Unique Selling    
    Point  8 - 8
  
-  8
Start Up Finance  12 2 14 1  15
Project Size  14 1 15 1  16
Management Skills/  
    Experience  8 2 10
  
3  13
Excessive Risks  10 1 11 2  13
Financial Factors  5 - 5 -  5
Application Withdrawn  8 2 10 12  22
Other  13 4 17 5  22
    
Total  162 15 177 26  203
 
  
The closest parallel to our research in the UK is an examination by Mason and 
Harrison (1995) of the reasons why a group of informal investors rejected 
applications.  (This work is particularly relevant as, it will be recalled, the Midland 
Enterprise Funds aim to liaise closely with business angels.)  That study confirmed 
(p.47/8) that “most investment opportunities are rejected for just one or two key 
reasons”, and it also highlighted “the importance of a flawed or incomplete marketing 
strategy and flawed or incomplete financial projections as significant deal killers”.  
While informal investors emphasise the value of marketing factors, they appear to 
place more weight on the ability of the entrepreneur/management team and finance 
factors than the venture capitalists in our study.  This apparent inconsistency 
probably stems from the fact that the latter two categories tend to be subsumed 
within our classification of “incomplete plan”.  
  
The interaction between the decision-making process and evaluation criteria is now 
further explored, by classifying the reasons for rejection or withdrawal of applications 
at three key stages within the investment cycle.    
  
Evaluation Criteria within the Fund’s Decision-Making Process  
  
When an application is received by the Fund, it progresses through the decision 
making process until a flaw is identified which, on its own or in combination with 
others, leads to rejection.  It is critical to note that such flaws occasionally did not 
appear until the final stages of the decision-making process, after completion of the 
due diligence process or when the funding agreement was ready for signature.  Our 
detailed findings indicate that the criteria for rejection change as the application 
progresses (confirming the findings of Mason and Harrison, 1995).  The analysis is 
therefore more comprehensive than Hall and Hofer (1993) who focused solely on the 
initial screening and assessment of business plans.  
  
Our results are summarised in Table 4, an extended version of Table 3.  The latter 
revealed a very high level of rejections; Table 4 shows that the vast majority of these 
occurred at the initial screening stage.  
  
The reasons for rejection are categorised at three key stages in the decision-making 
process.  
 
Screening Stage:  inadequate information was the primary cause of rejection, 
resulting in 59 of 162 rejections (36 percent).  (Hall and Hofer, 1993, p34, also found 
this factor to be the principal explanation for rejection at screening.)  Market 
characteristics, such as poor market conditions or the lack of an USP, were also 
important.  Crucially, the fund managers could establish relatively quickly whether 
these criteria were satisfied.  By contrast, issues requiring further probing - such as 
business strategy, financial factors and entrepreneurial characteristics - were 
relatively unimportant in the initial screening.  
  
The M/D and directors of the fund management company drew upon their wide 
experience of dealing with local industries (manufacturing and service) and their 
knowledge of the regional economy to decide whether a business had potential.  
This again confirms the findings of Hall and Hofer (1993, p35); 40 percent of 
rejections in that study arose because the fund managers applied intuitive logic, for 
example:  “... I have rejected other proposals in this business/industry and there is 
nothing in this proposal to indicate that it is different”.  
  
First Meeting Stage:  applications which progressed to this point failed to win 
backing for a variety of reasons, illustrated by the fact that “other” reasons accounted 
for 4 out of 15 rejections, for example:   
  
•  a weak member of the management team and some uncertainty regarding 
growth potential  
•  excessively slow response to requests for further information  
•  perceived inability of the fund managers and the management team to work in 
harmony;  compatibility between the two parties is essential to the long term 
success of the investment.  
 
A small number of applications (2) were withdrawn at this stage, when the meeting 
revealed that better working capital management by the applicant company would 
remove the need for funding.   
 
Second Meeting (and Subsequent) Stage(s):  the application was receiving very 
careful consideration and an investment offer was imminent.  Market-related factors 
had already been appraised and deemed to be satisfactory - Table 4 shows no 
rejections on these grounds.  However, as propositions were investigated in more 
depth, “other” problems which were not immediately obvious began to surface; for 
example, a failure to disclose the previous involvement of the directors in insolvency 
proceedings.  This sort of information cannot easily be obtained at the screening 
stage.  
  
A major concern was that a large proportion of applications reaching this stage (12 
out of 26) were withdrawn.  This was clearly a source of frustration for the Fund, as 
time and resources had been devoted to ultimately fruitless applications.  A number 
of withdrawals stemmed from changes in business circumstances (hence delaying 
the time the funds would be required or resulting in the abandonment of the 
proposal) and a dislike of the due-diligence procedure.  Other applicants were able 
to raise funds elsewhere on more favourable terms.  This is valuable information for 
both academics and practitioners.    
  
These late switches may have occurred because the fund managers were looking to 
back lower risk, typically asset-backed, companies in their first few deals, leaving 
scope for potential investee companies to negotiate with other providers.  Although 
individual deals have to remain confidential, we are aware that entrepreneurs were 
able to retain more control over their company by utilising, for example, the Loan 
Guarantee Scheme, soft loans from British Coal Enterprises or business angels for 
equity and/or preference shares.  (Research suggests that business angels make 
quicker decisions than venture capital funds:  Freear and Wetzel, 1992.)  
  
The time taken by the Fund to process applications varied over the period of the 
research.  In the early months of its operations, the applications were generally 
weak, hence the vast majority were rejected during initial screening within a few days 
of being received by the Fund.  At the end of the first six months of operation, for 
example, only one application had taken more than three months to process.  When 
higher quality applications warranting further investigation started to arrive, 
investment decisions frequently took several months.  Delays typically stemmed from 
the time involved in the production of due diligence reports or waiting for applicants 
to respond to requests for further information.  By the end of the research period (two 
years), 26 applications were under investigation.  Of these 26, 18 had been 
outstanding for under three months, 3 between three and six months, and 5 over six 
months.  For many firms seeking venture finance, a quick decision is crucial in 
enabling them to seize a market opportunity, and speed may be more important than 
the terms and conditions of the investment.  
 
The withdrawal of promising applications raises important issues, not only for the 
Fund, but also for the venture capital industry as a whole.  If good investments are 
hard to come by, then withdrawals may indicate some faults in the decision-making 
process.  Problems may initially stem from imperfect information, with applicants not 
fully understanding the nature of venture capital.  More generally, venture funds may 
be advised to speed up their procedures for processing applications, in order to 
retain potentially sound investments.  (The Fund described here did implement such 
action.) Although we could not establish a statistically significant link between 
withdrawals and the length of time an application had been in progress, informal 
discussions with fund managers indicated that the timescale was one of the factors 
that resulted in withdrawals.  
 
A Chi-Squared test was used to establish whether there were significant differences 
between the reasons for rejection at each of three stages.  Based on the cumulative 
totals at a 5 percent level, the results indicated no significant differences.  This would 
suggest a certain consistency of approach as applications are processed.  Although 
the overall pattern of reasons for rejection is broadly consistent, the dominant reason 
for rejection alters.  However, sample observations are inadequate to allow us to test 
whether changes in the frequency of any single criteria at any single stage are 
significant.  
 
The distinction between rejection at the screening versus first or second meeting 
stages can be further demonstrated with a selection of quotes from the Fund’s 
internal records - see Table 5 (overleaf).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Reasons for Rejection during the Decision-Making Process  
STAGE:  Initial screening  
    
PRIME REASON FOR 
REJECTION:  
Incomplete plan  
    
SAMPLE COMMENTS  
[Quotes from Fund’s records]  
No technical specification; no 
description of operation. Poor plan.  
  
No clear breakdown of requirements, 
financial structure and market.  
Growth potential doubt.  
  
Capital base unrealistic for a very 
competitive market. No input from 
directors. No CVs. Directors starting 
business after previous failure.  
  
Very competitive market. High risk start-
up. USP not obvious.  
    
STAGE:  First Meeting  
    
PRIME REASON FOR 
REJECTION:  
No Dominant Reason  
    
SAMPLE COMMENTS:  Appears to have some potential but 
funds are not required for some time.  
  
Doubts about market. Further 
investigations cast doubt over 
management ability.  
    
STAGE:  Second Meeting  
    
PRIME REASON FOR 
REJECTION:  
Applications Withdrawn  
    
SAMPLE COMMENTS:  Directors received an alternative offer of 
finance.  
  
Application withdrawn following poor 
sales figures for the last quarter.  
  
Originally rejected due to weak balance 
sheet. Traded out of difficulties, but 
needs changes in the management 
structure which are unlikely to happen.  
We can now develop a simple model of the Fund’s investment cycle, linking the 
evaluation criteria to specific stages in the decision-making process.  This issue has 
rarely been tackled in previous studies.    
 
The legitimacy of a model based upon the study of a single fund might be 
questioned.  Robinson (1987, p73) postulated that fund managers would remain 
virtually uniform in their evaluation criteria, despite operating in an increasingly 
differentiated industry.  This contention was dismissed as “uninformed speculation” 
Sandberg et al. (1988, p12); these researchers acknowledged consensus in the 
identity of the venture capitalists’ criteria, but stressed that different fund managers 
could apply different weights to the same criteria.  Sweeting (1991, p613) found a 
high degree of uniformity across venture funds in the “mechanics” of processing 
applications, although the funds took differing perspectives on certain issues during 
their in-depth evaluations.  
  
We do not suggest that the policies of the Fund studied here can be developed into a 
definitive model of venture capitalists’ behaviour, but we are convinced that the 
detailed study of a single fund offers a useful contribution to the academic debate.  
 
 
A Model of the Decision-Making for the Fund 
  
Research work in this field has tended to focus on the development of ex ante 
models of investment behaviour, either normative or evaluation models.  The latter 
are derived from the assessment of actual propositions.  Alternatively, performance-
based models have assessed the success or otherwise of investee companies.  Our 
model falls into the ex ante evaluation category, as the empirical data relate to 
specific deals before the decision to accept/reject an application was made.    
  
The dominant evaluation criteria at each stage of the decision-making process is 
summarised overleaf:  
 
 
 1.   Generating a Deal Flow:  no decision required  
  
2.   Initial Screening:  a full plan suggesting that a business has an USP and high 
growth potential.  
  
3.  First Meeting:  a capable, credible management team; and the right 
“chemistry” between the fund managers and the management of the potential 
investee company.  
  
4/5. Second Meeting/Board Presentation: confirmation of management skills, 
business growth potential and the financial elements of a proposition.  
  
6/7. Due Diligence/Deal Structuring:  financial and personal history - any skeletons 
in the cupboard?  
  
In the final stages of the investment cycle (monitoring of investments and cashing 
out), the fund managers will be most concerned with patterns of growth in evidence 
and any divergence from plans.    
  
The four investments actually completed (which satisfied the above criteria) were 
companies in very diverse industries:  a sub-contract packing service, specialising in 
consumer products that require hand finishing; the application of new technology to 
the manufacture of environmentally-friendly cleaning, maintenance and horticultural 
chemicals; a manufacturer of industrial doors and shutters;  and a dual-franchise car 
dealership located on a greenfield site.  
  
An investment ratio of approximately 2 per cent clearly involves much work to 
identify potential investee companies.  The M/D of the fund management company 
holds the view that venture capitalists have to kiss a lot of toads before finding a 
prince, and also that completing the “pre-kiss courtship” (seeing the toads in a true 
light!) can prove very time consuming and frustrating.    
  
 
 Conclusion  
  
The study conducted for this paper has a distinct advantage over other studies, 
because it analyses “real time” investment decisions made by a single fund over a 
two year period.  Our findings offer four contributions to research in this field.  
  
First, our research confirms the venture capitalists’ decision-making process is multi-
staged.  
  
Second, our study (and literature survey) suggests that entrepreneurs essentially 
have to satisfy broadly similar selection criteria to secure venture funding whichever 
fund is approached.  These criteria can be classified under a few key headings:  
 
• the specific requirements of the individual fund (size of investment, location of 
firm, etc)  
 
• the market for the product, notably the degree of competition in, and the growth 
potential of, the market   
 
• management skills and commitment.  
 
Third, and most importantly, the experience of the Fund suggests that the academic 
debate on the relative significance of different evaluation criteria may have little 
relevance for practitioners.  For example, there is probably no real difference of 
opinion among fund managers on whether market potential matters more than 
entrepreneurial skills, even though studies dealing with the initial screening stage 
might suggest that venture capitalists concentrate on the former at the expense of 
the latter.  In our analysis of the Fund’s operations, we did not attempt to measure 
the precise weights applied to specific criteria as applications are progressed.  
However, it was apparent that different criteria were considered at each successive 
stage of the decision-making process.    
  
This theme is developed in our fourth finding.  Our model demonstrates that it is not 
possible to deal independently with the two issues of the decision-making process 
and evaluation criteria.  Time is at a premium, and each venture fund develops a 
system to eliminate weak applications in an efficient manner.  Initially, the venture 
capitalist’s main role is to decide which proposals are worthy of further investigation.  
Some defects are easier to detect than others - the lack of a unique selling point, will 
soon be evident, whereas it will take time to establish (say) that a company seeking 
funds has a management team which can work in harmony with the fund managers.  
Market factors are therefore evaluated at an early stage, whereas criteria relating to 
entrepreneurial characteristics and financial factors do not appear to be critical until a 
proposal has progressed beyond the screening stage.  
  
Further research would serve to clarify the nature of the link between evaluation 
criteria and the specific stages of the decision-making process.  It would also be 
helpful to establish whether the model developed for a single is applicable to other 
funds, and to track the success or otherwise of the Fund’s investee companies, 
thereby moving to a performance-based model.  
  
Finally, one observation from the research which should be brought to the attention 
of practitioners is the fact that so many applicants withdraw at a late stage.  The 
speedy processing of applications is vital to retain attractive investee companies.  
The number of late withdrawals also suggests the need for flexibility in structuring 
the deal, and a willingness to renegotiate if an alternative offer is received from 
elsewhere.  Otherwise, there is a risk of high staff costs being incurred in achieving a 
relatively low investment rate.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Applications to the Midland Enterprise Fund  
 
GUIDANCE NOTES ON PREPARING A BUSINESS PLAN [EXTRACTS]  
  
The Fund is only able to accept applications in the form of a comprehensive 
Business Plan.  Every business is unique and so is every Business Plan.  Your plan 
should reflect you and your business and because of this it should be prepared by 
you and not by an advisor.  It is always useful to get expert advice but you must be 
able to answer any question about the plan.  Remember that there are several 
sources of help in preparing a business plan - in particular your local Training and 
Enterprise Council has made arrangements to provide free or subsidised business 
advice and information.  
  
KEY AREAS OF FOCUS  
Management  
You need to demonstrate that your team has the management skills needed to run 
the business and make the most of the opportunities you have identified.  Include a 
comprehensive CV for each of the key members of your team.  
Market  
Prove that there is a real market for your products or services and that you can meet 
its requirements.  Market research, past sales figures and letters of interest from 
prospective customers are all valuable evidence.  
Finance  
Show how much money you will need (cash flow projections), the profit you expect to 
make (profit & loss projection) and what assets the business has (current and 
projected balance sheets).  Past accounts are essential for established businesses 
and there should be no significant gap between those and the start of the 
projections.  
 
 Please remember that our decision to take your application further will be made on 
the basis of your business plan and if any of these key areas are not adequately 
covered it will put your proposal at a considerable disadvantage.  
 
 
 
Postscript  
  
With effect from 1 July 1997, The Midlands’ Enterprise Fund was launched from the 
merger of The Midland Enterprise Fund for the East Midlands with The Midland 
Enterprise Fund for the West Midlands.  Midland Bank plc has provided a further £2 
million, increasing the size of the new fund to £4.5 million.  Midlands Venture Fund 
Managers Limited remain as Fund Managers.  The present Managing Director is 
John O’Neill.   
 
 
 
Notes  
  
1
 Due diligence, according to the Financial Services Act, involves checking all the 
information deemed to be “necessary” for an application;  the amount of detail 
required will clearly vary between (say) a £5m and £5,000 deal  
2
 The decision-making process incorporates the initial screening and evaluation of an 
application for funding and also the subsequent appraisal process, up to the point 
where a final decision is made by the Fund on whether to reject or accept the 
proposition; the process also includes confirmation that the terms of the proposed 
deal are acceptable to all parties  
3
 The investment cycle includes the generation of applications, the complete 
decision-making process and also the management and liquidation of an investment.  
4
 The evaluation or selection criteria are the factors considered in the initial 
screening of an application and later appraisal stages  
5
 The fund managers confirmed that the first-named reason did not simply reflect the 
ordering of the material in the application, and that it represented their personal view 
- not a sanitised justification of the decision to outsiders.  
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